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Aboriginal Title and Indigenous Governance:
Identifying the Holders of Rights and Authority
© Kent McNeil *
Research Paper, 31 May 2016

Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982, recognizes and affirms the
“aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal peoples of Canada”. The
Aboriginal peoples are defined in s.35(2) as including “the Indian, Inuit and
Métis peoples of Canada.” That is the extent to which the Canadian
Constitution identifies the potential holders of s.35 rights, leaving the matter
to be resolved by judicial decisions or negotiated agreements. This research
paper examines how Canadian courts have addressed the issue of identifying
Aboriginal rights holders in specific instances, mainly in parts of Canada
that are not subject to historical or modern-day treaties relating to land. As
the focus is on the law of the Canadian state as interpreted and applied by
the courts, especially the Supreme Court of Canada, the analysis is doctrinal.
Of course Indigenous peoples have their own legal orders, 1 and I am of the
*

Osgoode Hall Law School, Toronto. I am very grateful to Julia Drehuta and Margarita Malkina for their
diligent and thorough research assistance, from which I benefited immensely in preparing this research
paper. I would also like to thank the participants at the Conference on Determining Access: Theory and
Practice in Implementing Indigenous Governance over Lands and Resources, Thompson Rivers University
and the Interior Alliance, Kamloops, B.C., February 15-16, 2016, for valuable feedback on an oral
presentation of this paper. Special thanks also are due to Chris Albinati, Julie Falck, Janna Promislow,
Kathy Simo, and Kerry Wilkins for reading a draft and providing insightful comments.
1
See e.g. Val Napoleon, “Tsilhqot’in Law of Consent” (2015) UBC L. Rev. 873 [Napoleon, “Tsilhqot’in
Law”], and “Thinking About Indigenous Legal Orders”, National Centre for First Nations Governance
Research Paper, 18 June 2007, online: http://fngovernance.org/ncfng_research/val_napoleon.pdf; Ardith
Walkem, “An Unfulfilled Promise: Still Fighting to Make Space for Indigenous Legal Traditions”, in Maria
Morellato, ed., Aboriginal Law Since Delgamuukw (Aurora, ON: Canada Law Book, 2009), 393; John
Borrows, Canada’s Indigenous Constitution (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010). For discussion
of the relevance of Indigenous norm generation to the issues discussed in this paper, and of broader
theoretical and practical considerations, see Brent Olthuis, “The Constitution’s Peoples: Approaching
Community in the context of Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982” (2009) 54 McGill L.J. 1.
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view that identification of Aboriginal rights holders should involve the
application of Indigenous law, derived from Indigenous governance
authority. Canadian courts can, and occasionally do, take account of
Indigenous law in rendering decisions, but they inevitably do so within the
framework of the Canadian legal system from which they derive their
authority, rather than within the context of Indigenous legal orders and
governance authority. So when Indigenous people go to or end up in
Canadian courts, either by choice or because they have been charged with an
offence or sued in a civil action, they find themselves subject to the
Canadian law that is applied by the courts. It is therefore essential for them
to know how a Canadian court might address the matters at issue, which can
include determining the identity of Aboriginal rights claimants.
In this paper, I am going to discuss three categories of decisions: (1)
Aboriginal title cases; (2) Aboriginal rights cases apart from title; and (3)
duty to consult cases. My focus is mainly on Supreme Court decisions
involving First Nation Indigenous people arising in non-treaty areas. The
issue of the identity of Aboriginal title and rights holders can also arise in
cases involving the Inuit and the Métis, but there is a scarcity of case law on
the issue where the Inuit are concerned, 2 and the unique circumstances of the
Métis and the current length of this paper led me to conclude that a separate
research paper would be necessary for the issue of the identity of Métis
rights holders to be dealt with adequately.
1. Aboriginal Title Cases

2

For a rare exception, see Hamlet of Clyde River v. TGS-NOPEC Geophysical Co. ASA (TGS), 2015 FCA
179, 474 N.R. 96 [Hamlet of Clyde River], leave to appeal to the S.C.C. granted March 10, 2016.
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Five foundational Aboriginal title cases have reached the Supreme Court of
Canada: 3 Calder v. Attorney General of British Columbia; 4 Delgamuukw v.
British Columbia;5 R. v. Marshall; R v. Bernard; 6 and Tsilhqot’in Nation v.
British Columbia. 7 While the matter of the appropriate title holders was not
a live issue in Calder and Marshall/Bernard, these decisions are nonetheless
relevant and important because they reveal underlying assumptions of the
parties and the judges.
Calder was a representative action, brought by Frank Calder and other
members of the Nisga’a Nation (referred to as the Nishga Nation and the
Nishga Indian Tribe in the case) on behalf of that nation, seeking a

3

Although Aboriginal title was discussed in St. Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Company v. The Queen
(1886), 13 S.C.R. 577, affirmed (1888) 14 App. Cas. 46 (P.C.), the case involved a dispute between the
federal government and the Province of Ontario over entitlement to lands and resources after the Aboriginal
title had been supposedly surrendered by Treaty 3 (1873). No Indigenous nations or persons were party to
the action or even called as witnesses.
4
[1973] S.C.R. 313 [Calder].
5
[1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 [Delgamuukw, SCC].
6
R. v. Marshall and R. v. Bernard were heard together in the Supreme Court, resulting in a single
judgment: [2005] 2 S.C.R. 220 [Marshall/Bernard].
7
[2014] 2 S.C.R. 257 [Tsilhqot’in Nation, SCC]. In addition to these five Supreme Court decisions, see the
decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in Oregon Jack Creek Indian Band v. Canadian National
Railway, [1990] 2 C.N.L.R. 85 [Oregon Jack Creek Indian Band], affirmed in brief oral reasons, [1989] 2
S.C.R. 1069. This decision involved an application to amend a statement of claim, brought by 36 chiefs of
Indian bands on behalf of themselves and all other members of their bands, alleging that double-tracking of
a section of the CNR along the Thompson River would negatively affect Aboriginal title and fishing rights
in the Thompson and Fraser rivers. In allowing the amendment of the representative action to include all
members of the three Aboriginal nations whose ancestors had occupied lands along these rivers prior to
European colonization, MacFarlane J.A., delivering the unanimous judgment, stated at page 92: “In my
opinion, the date at which it must be shown that there was an organized society occupying the specific
territory over which the plaintiffs, as descendants of the members of that society, now assert aboriginal title
is the date at which sovereignty was asserted by the Europeans. The society need not have been what we
now regard as a legal entity, and the descendants of that society need not, in order to have status to bring an
action, prove that such a legal entity now exists. Whether the plaintiffs can establish the necessary criteria
and show that they are descendants of the members of a society who in common held such aboriginal rights
is a matter to be determined on evidence.” In a short judgment dismissing an application to rehear the
appeal it had already rejected, the Supreme Court observed that, in pronouncing “that the action was
personal in nature rather than derivative and the plaintiffs need not establish either the continued existence
of the Indian nations nor authority to bring the action…, the Court of Appeal went beyond the narrow issue
before them – whether the pleadings were clearly invalid”, but the Court decided that those obiter
pronouncements did not affect the outcome on that narrow issue and so did not provide grounds for a
rehearing (the Supreme Court declined to comment on the correctness of the pronouncements): [1990] 1
S.C.R. 117 at para. 3. As far as I am aware, this case never went to trial. On the B.C.C.A. decision, see also
Olthuis, above note 1 at 11-12.
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declaration “that the aboriginal title, otherwise known as the Indian title, of
the Plaintiffs to their ancient tribal territory hereinbefore described, has
never been lawfully extinguished.” 8 The trial judge found that the plaintiffs,
who were officers of the Nishga Tribal Council and councilors of the four
Indian Act bands into which the Nisga’a Nation had been divided, were
“appropriate and adequate representatives to bring the action on the part of
the Nishga Indian Tribe”. 9 They were described by Justice Judson of the
Supreme Court of Canada as “descendants of the Indians who have inhabited
since time immemorial the territory in question”.10 No one, including the
plaintiffs who were members of the Nisga’a band councils, seems to have
questioned that, if Aboriginal title existed, it was held by the Nisga’a Nation
as a whole, not by the Indian bands or other subgroups within the nation.
However, the consequences of the nation holding title were not addressed, as
the Supreme Court refused the declaration because a majority of the judges
decided that the action could not be brought against the Crown in right of
British Columbia without a fiat (basically, permission) of the Lieutenant
Governor of the province.11
Marshall/Bernard involved prosecutions under provincial statutes in
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick for harvesting and possessing logs on
lands the provinces claimed as Crown lands. The accused, who are members
of the Mi’kmaq Nation in Nova Scotia and the Miramichi Mi’kmaq in New
Brunswick, raised Aboriginal title, as well as treaty rights, as their defence.
There seems to have been no question that they are Mi’kmaqs who would be
8

Calder, above note 4 at 345, quoting from the statement of claim.
Calder v. Attorney General of British Columbia (1969), 8 D.L.R. (3d) 59 at 61 (B.C.S.C.).
10
Calder, above note 4 at 317.
11
In his dissent, concurred in by Spence and Laskin JJ., Hall J. would have simply issued a declaration that
“the appellants’ right to possession … and their right to enjoy the fruits of the soil, of the forest, and of the
rivers and streams within the boundaries of said lands have not been extinguished”: ibid. at 422.
9
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entitled to the benefits of Aboriginal title if they were able to establish that
the Mi’kmaq had Aboriginal title to the sites where the cutting of timber
took place. However, as the Supreme Court agreed with the trial judges that
the accused had not proven that the Mi’kmaq exclusively occupied the sites
at the time of the British Crown’s assertion of sovereignty, their claim to
Aboriginal title failed. Since they were also unable to convince the judges
that they had treaty rights to harvest timber commercially, they were
convicted.
In his trial judgment in R. v. Bernard,12 Justice Lordon seems to have
taken for granted that the Miramichi Mi’kmaq, rather than the three
Mi’kmaq bands with reserves in the area of New Brunswick where title was
asserted, would be the Aboriginal title holders if title had been proven,
which he decided it had not. On appeal, the New Brunswick Court of Appeal
decided that the Miramichi Mi’kmaq do have collective Aboriginal title to
the Northwest Miramichi watershed,13 but this decision was overturned by
the Supreme Court.
In R. v. Marshall,14 the accused asserted that the Mi’kmaq had
Aboriginal title to all of Nova Scotia. Justice Curran at trial accepted that
they had lived in individual communities that got together on occasions,
concluding that, although “they did not have a fully-developed sense of
being a nation…, [t]hey were still a collection of communities.”15 However,
as he found that Aboriginal title had not been proven, the significance of this
finding for the identity of the putative title holders was not discussed. The
Nova Scotia Court of Appeal ordered a new trial because, among other
12

[2000] 3 C.N.L.R. 184 (N.B. Prov. Ct.).
R. v. Bernard, 2003 NBCA 55, [2003] 4 C.N.L.R. 48 at paras.190 (Daigle J.A.), 309-10 (Robertson J.A.).
14
2001 NSPC 2, [2001] 2 C.N.L.R. 256 (N.S. Prov. Ct.) at para. 3 [Marshall, Prov. Ct.].
15
Ibid. at para. 55.
13
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reasons, it held that Justice Curran, and the Summary Conviction Appeal
Court that upheld his decision,16 had applied the wrong test for assessing the
occupation required to establish Aboriginal title.17 Cromwell J.A. (since
appointed to the Supreme Court of Canada) reviewed the trial judge’s
findings of fact on the Mi’kmaq social and political organization,
territoriality, and land tenure and use, and seems to have accepted that the
divisions of their territory in Nova Scotia into seven districts and family
hunting territories were developments that came after the British Crown’s
assertion of sovereignty. 18 As the trial judge had found that there was “no
persuasive evidence that they divided the entire territory among their
communities” prior to sovereignty, 19 Cromwell J.A. apparently thought that
their Aboriginal title, if proven, would be held by the Mi’kmaq people of
Nova Scotia as a whole.
On appeal of the Marshall and Bernard cases to the Supreme Court,
Chief Justice McLachlin stated the central issue to be whether “the Mi’kmaq
people in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick … have treaty rights or
Aboriginal title entitling them” to “engage in commercial logging on Crown
lands without authorization”.20 Throughout her judgment, she referred to the
“Mi’kmaq” and “Mi’kmaq people” as the Aboriginal title claimants, without
separating them into individual communities or bands. This is consistent
16

2002 NSSC 57, [2002] 3 C.N.L.R. 176.
[2004] 1 C.N.L.R. 211, especially at paras. 249-53 (Cromwell J.A.) [Marshall, CA]. Oland J.A.
concurred with Cromwell J.A., and Saunders J.A. also agreed with his reasons and disposition on the title
issue.
18
Ibid. at paras. 141-52.
19
Marshall, Prov. Ct., above note 14 at para. 131, quoted and emphasized by Cromwell J.A., Marshall,
CA, above note 17 at para. 151.
20
Marshall/Bernard, above note 6 at para. 1. Note that, in my respectful opinion, the way McLachlin
C.J.C. framed this issue begged the question of whether lands subject to Aboriginal title really are Crown
lands: see Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Title and the Supreme Court: What’s Happening?” (2006) 69 Sask. L.
Rev. 281 at 293-96. However, in Tsilhqot’in Nation, SCC, above note 7 at para. 70, she returned to this
issue and clarified that the Crown’s underlying title to Aboriginal title lands does not have any beneficial
content.
17
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with how the constitutional questions were stated in each case, asking
whether the provincial legislation under which the accused had been charged
is “inconsistent with Mi’kmaq Aboriginal title”. 21
The issue of the appropriate claimants in Aboriginal title cases was
addressed more directly in Delgamuukw v. British Columbia. Unlike
Marshall/Bernard, where Aboriginal title was raised as a defence to
prosecutions, Delgamuukw involved a direct claim by the Gitksan and
Wet’suwet’en peoples for a declaration of their Aboriginal title. It was a
representative action, brought by “39 hereditary Gitksan and 12
Wet’suwet’en (total 51) chiefs for all or most of the Houses of the Gitksan
and Wet’suwet’en peoples, except … the 12 Kitwancool chiefs.” 22 The
position advanced by the plaintiffs at trial, as expressed by Chief Justice
McEachern, was “that their chiefs are themselves, as well as on behalf of
Houses or members, entitled to a judgment declaring their ownership, under
Canadian, Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en law of the individual territories they
claim. There is no specific alternative claim pleaded by the plaintiffs
collectively for the territory or any part of it on a communal, people-wide
basis.” 23 As is well known, McEachern C.J.S.C. dismissed their claims,
leading to appeals to the British Columbia Court of Appeal and then to the
Supreme Court of Canada.
The Supreme Court overturned McEachern C.J.S.C.’s judgment and
ordered a new trial, partly because of his treatment of the oral histories, but
also because the plaintiffs had reframed the nature of the claim before the
21

Marshall/Bernard, above note 6 at paras. 107-8.
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia (1991), 79 D.L.R. (4th) 185 (B.C.S.C.) at 237 [Delgamuukw, BCSC].
For a list of the plaintiffs, see the style of cause in Delgamuukw, SCC, above note 5. Note that there are
Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en band councils as well under the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5, and the GitksanWet’suwet’en Tribal Council was formed in 1978, but while the latter played a coordinating role in the
court case, it was not a plaintiff claiming title: Delgamuukw, BCSC, at 234-37.
23
Delgamuukw, BCSC, above note 22 at 237.
22
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Supreme Court. Chief Justice Lamer explained that, on appeal, “the
individual claims by each house have been amalgamated into two communal
claims, one advanced on behalf of each nation. However, there were no
formal amendments to the pleadings to this effect.” 24 He found this to be
problematic:
Given the absence of an amendment to the pleadings, I must
reluctantly conclude that the respondents [British Columbia and
Canada] suffered some prejudice. The appellants [the Gitksan
and Wet’suwet’en] argue that the respondents did not
experience prejudice since the collective and individual claims
are related to the extent that the territory claimed by each nation
is merely the sum of the individual claims of each House; the
external boundaries of the collective claims therefore represent
the outer boundaries of the outer territories. Although that
argument carries considerable weight, it does not address the
basic point that the collective claims were simply not in issue at
trial. To frame the case in a different manner on appeal would
retroactively deny the respondents the opportunity to know the
appellants’ case.25
Although the defect in the pleadings, combined with the mistreatment
of the oral histories, prevented the Court from deciding the case on its
merits, Lamer C.J.C. nonetheless proceeded to provide guidelines to trial
courts on a number of vital issues, including proof, content, infringement,
and extinguishment of Aboriginal title. For the purposes of this research
paper, the most relevant aspect of his judgment is his apparent acceptance
throughout that, if the case had been properly pleaded, Aboriginal title
would be held by Aboriginal nations rather than by smaller collectives
within nations, such as the Gitksan and Wet’suwet’en houses. In a
particularly relevant passage, he stated:
24

Delgamuukw, SCC, above note 5 at para. 73. British Columbia and Canada argued that they were
prejudiced as a result: ibid.
25
Ibid. at para. 76.
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A further dimension of Aboriginal title is the fact that it is held
communally. Aboriginal title cannot be held by individual
Aboriginal persons; it is a collective right to land held by all
members of an Aboriginal nation. Decisions with respect to that
land are also made by that community. This is another feature
of aboriginal title which is sui generis and distinguishes it from
normal property interests.26
This should not be interpreted to mean that the rights and interests of houses,
clans, and other smaller groups are unimportant or lack legal validity.
Instead, I understand it to mean that Aboriginal title is a territorial right
vested in the whole nation that applies externally as against the Crown and
other persons who are not members of that nation.27 It is what my colleague
Brian Slattery has referred to as a generic right because, apart perhaps from
its inherent limit that does not allow the land to be used in ways that
substantially diminish its value for future generations,28 it does not vary
from one Aboriginal nation to another. 29 It provides common law – and,
since 1982, constitutional – protection to Indigenous territories within
Canada.30 Internally, houses, clans, families, individuals, and so on continue
26

Ibid. at para. 115 [emphasis added].
For further discussion, see Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Title in Canada: Site-Specific or Territorial?”
(2012) 91 Can. Bar Rev. 745.
28
See Delgamuukw, SCC, above note 5 at paras. 125-32; Tsilhqot’in Nation, SCC, above note 7 at paras.
74, 88. Note that McLachlin C.J.C. in the latter case reformulated the inherent limit from a backwardlooking limit determined by historical uses to a forward-looking approach emphasizing sustainability: see
Brian Slattery, “The Constitutional Dimensions of Aboriginal Title” (2015) 71 Supreme Court L. Rev. (2d)
45 at 58-63 [Slattery, “Constitutional Dimensions”]; Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Title and the Provinces
after Tsilhqot’in Nation” (2015) 71 Supreme Court L. Rev. (2d) 67 at 68 [McNeil, “Aboriginal Title and
the Provinces”]. Query whether this reformulation makes the inherent limit more uniform among
Aboriginal title holders.
29
Brian Slattery, “Understanding Aboriginal Rights” (1987) 66 Can. Bar Rev. 727 at 745 [Slattery,
“Understanding Aboriginal Rights”], and “The Metamorphosis of Aboriginal Title” (2006) 85 Can. Bar
Rev. 255 at 269-71 [Slattery, “Metamorphosis”], both quoted with approval by Vickers J. in his trial
judgment in Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, 2007 BCSC 1700, [2008] 1 C.N.L.R. 112 at paras.
471-72 (B.C.S.C.) [Tsilhqot’in Nation, BCSC], and also cited with apparent approval by Groberman J.A. in
his judgment on appeal in the same case, subnom. William v. British Columbia, 2012 BCCA 285, [2012] 3
C.N.L.R. 333 at para. 149 (B.C.C.A.) [Tsilhqot’in Nation, BCCA].
30
See Kent McNeil, “Aboriginal Title as a Constitutionally Protected Property Right”, in Owen Lippert,
ed., Beyond the Nass Valley: National Implications of the Supreme Court's Delgamuukw Decision
27
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to have rights under a nation’s Indigenous laws,31 which are subject to the
territorial authority of the nation and so should be alterable through the
exercise of its inherent right of self-government. 32
The more recent case of Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia is the
strongest precedent so far on the identity of Aboriginal title holders, given
that this was a contentious issue that was dealt with in some depth both at
trial and in the Court of Appeal. Like Delgamuukw, this was a representative
action for a declaration of Aboriginal title and other Aboriginal rights,
brought by Chief Roger William “on his own behalf and on behalf of all
other members of the Xeni Gwet’in First Nations Government and on behalf
of all other members of the Tsilhqot’in Nation”. 33 The Xeni Gwet’in, of
which Roger Williams is chief, is one of the six Indian Act bands that make
up the Tsilhqot’in Nation. The plaintiff and Canada (a defendant in the case,
but supporting the plaintiff’s position on this issue) contended that the
community of Tsilhqot’in people is the holder of the title and other
(Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 2000), 55, republished in Kent McNeil, Emerging Justice? Essays on
Indigenous Rights in Canada and Australia (Saskatoon: University of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre,
2001), 292; McNeil, “Aboriginal Title and the Provinces”, above note 28.
31
See Behn v. Moulton Contracting Ltd., [2013] 2 S.C.R. 227 at paras. 30-31[Behn], quoted in text
accompanying notes 108-9 below.
32
See Slattery, “Metamorphosis”, above note 29 at 270, and “Constitutional Dimensions”, above note 28 at
52-54; Jeremy Webber, “The Public Law Dimension of Indigenous Property Rights”, in Nigel Bankes and
Timo Koivurova, eds., The Proposed Nordic Saami Convention: National and International Dimensions of
Indigenous Property Rights (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2013), 79; Kent McNeil, “Exclusive Occupation and
Joint Aboriginal Title” (2015) 48 UBC L. Rev. 821 at 870-71 [McNeil, “Joint Aboriginal Title”].
Aboriginal nations’ inherent right of self-government over their Aboriginal title lands was acknowledged
by Williamson J. in Campbell v. British Columbia, [2000] 4 C.N.L.R. 1 (B.C.S.C.) [Campbell v. B.C.]: see
discussion in Kent McNeil, “Judicial Approaches to Self-Government since Calder: Searching for
Doctrinal Coherence”, in Hamar Foster, Heather Raven, and Jeremy Webber, eds., Let Right Be Done:
Aboriginal Title, the Calder Case, and the Future of Indigenous Rights (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2007), 129
at 139-43. In House of Sga’nisim v. Canada (Attorney General), [2012] 2 C.N.L.R. 82 (B.C.S.C.), Smith J.
followed Campbell v. B.C. out of comity, but also held that the governance provisions of the Nisga’a Final
Agreement, 1998, the validity of which were challenged in these cases, could be upheld as delegated
governmental authority. Smith J.’s decision was affirmed on appeal on the latter basis, without deciding the
inherent right issue: 2013 BCCA 49, [2013] 2 C.N.L.R. 226, leave to appeal refused, [2013] S.C.C.A. No.
44. For commentary, see Joshua Nichols, “A Reconciliation without Recollection? Chief Mountain and the
Sources of Sovereignty” (2015) 48 UBC L. Rev. 515.
33
Tsilhqot’in Nation, BCSC, above note 29, style of cause.
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Aboriginal rights, whereas British Columbia argued at trial, and again in the
British Columbia Court of Appeal, that the title and rights holder is the Xeni
Gwet’in people. 34 The trial judge, Justice Vickers, reviewed the limited
Supreme Court of Canada jurisprudence on this issue (especially Calder,
Delgamuukw, Marshall/Bernard, and the Métis Aboriginal rights case, R. v.
Powley 35), and observed:
No matter how a contemporary community defines
membership, a critical inquiry for the purposes of s.35(1) rights
is an ancestral connection to the relevant community extant at
contact in the case of rights, or at sovereignty, in the case of
title. In all of the Aboriginal rights and title decisions I have
reviewed, the relevant historic community has been the larger
First Nation that existed at the time of contact or sovereignty. 36
This raises the issue of continuity between the Aboriginal nation in
whom title vested at the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty37 and the
present title-holding collective. In Marshall/Bernard, McLachlin C.J.C. put
it this way: “The requirement of continuity in its most basic sense simply
means that claimants must establish they are right holders. Modern-day
claimants must establish a connection with the pre-sovereignty group upon
whose practices they rely to assert title or claim to a more restricted
aboriginal right.”38 However, although there must be an ancestral connection
34

Ibid. at para. 437. One reason why British Columbia contended that title is held by the band rather than
the nation as a whole was practical: to fulfil its duty to consult, the province argued that it needs to be able
to engage with a definable legal entity, and the evidence revealed that the Tsilhqot’in Nation as a whole
lacked a national political structure. See Tsilhqot’in Nation, BCCA, above note 29 at paras. 138-43. But the
province also raised a jurisprudential issue: see text accompanying notes 45-47 below.
35
[2003] 2 S.C.R. 207 [Powley].
36
Tsilhqot’in Nation, BCSC, above note 29 at para. 445.
37
See Delgamuukw, SCC, above note 5 at para. 145, per Lamer C.J.C.: “Aboriginal title crystallized at the
time sovereignty was asserted.” For discussion in light of Tsilhqot’in Nation, SCC, above note 7, see
McNeil, “Aboriginal Title and the Provinces”, above note 28 at 71-78.
38
Marshall/Bernard, above note 6 at para. 67. See also the quotation from Oregon Jack Creek Indian Band
in note 7 above. Note that this is only one way in which the concept of continuity applies in the context of
Aboriginal rights. As McLachlin C.J.C. went on to say in Marshall/Bernard, it can also mean that there
must be a sufficient similarity or connection between the historical practice on which an Aboriginal right is
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by descent or succession between the Aboriginal people who were in
exclusive occupation at the time of Crown sovereignty and the current
claimants, 39 this does not mean that they need be socially or politically
organized in the same way. 40
Returning to Vickers J.’s judgment, on this issue he concluded:
[T]he proper rights holder, whether for Aboriginal title or
Aboriginal rights, is the community of Tsilhqot’in people.
Tsilhqot’in people were the historic community of people
sharing language, customs, traditions, historical experience,
territory and resources at the time of first contact and at
sovereignty assertion. The Aboriginal rights of individual
Tsilhqot’in people or any other sub-group within the
Tsilhqot’in Nation are derived from the collective actions,
shared language, traditions and shared historical experiences of
the members of the Tsilhqot’in Nation.41
Regarding British Columbia’s argument that Tsilhqot’in bands are the
proper holders of Aboriginal rights and title today, Vickers J. observed:
The setting aside of reserves and the establishment of bands
was a convenience to government at both levels. The creation
based and the exercise of the right in the present. See also R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507 at paras.
60-65 [Van der Peet]; Lax Kw’alaams Indian Band v. Canada (Attorney General), [2011] 3 S.C.R. 535 at
paras. 48-59 [Lax Kw’alaams]. When present occupation of land is relied upon to raise an inference of
occupation at the time of Crown assertion of sovereignty for the purpose of establishing Aboriginal title,
there must also be continuity between the present-day and historical occupation: see Delgamuukw, SCC,
above note 5 at paras. 152-54; Tsilhqot’in Nation, SCC, above note 7 at paras. 45-46. For more detailed
discussion, see Kent McNeil, “Continuity of Aboriginal Rights”, in Kerry Wilkins, ed., Advancing
Aboriginal Claims: Visions/Strategies/Directions (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 2004), 127.
39
See also La Forest J.’s concurring judgment in Delgamuukw, SCC, above note 5 at para. 198, where he
suggested that “the presence of two or more aboriginal groups in a territory may also have an impact on
continuity of use. For instance, one aboriginal group may have ceded its possession to subsequent
occupants or merged its territory with that of another aboriginal society. As well, the occupancy of one
aboriginal society may be connected to the occupancy of another society by conquest or exchange. In these
circumstances, continuity of use and occupation, extending back to the relevant time, may very well be
established.”
40
See Tsilhqot’in Nation, BCSC, above note 29 at para. 457: “The political structures may change from
time to time. Self identification may shift from band identification to cultural identification depending on
the circumstances. What remains constant are the common threads of language, customs, traditions and a
shared history that form the central ‘self’ of a Tsilhqot’in person. The Tsilhqot’in Nation is the community
with whom Tsilhqot’in people are connected by those four threads.”
41
Ibid. at para. 470.
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of bands did not alter the true identity of the people. Their true
identity lies in their Tsilhqot’in lineage, their shared language,
customs, traditions and historical experiences. While band level
organization may have meaning to a Canadian federal
bureaucracy, it is without any meaning in the resolution of
Aboriginal title and rights for Tsilhqot’in people.42
Although the Xeni Gwet’in people are regarded by the Tsilhqot’in as the
caretakers of the lands in the Claim Area (which consists of only about 5%
of the Tsilhqot’in’s claimed traditional territory43), Vickers J. observed that
“the caretakers have no more rights to the land or the resources than any
other Tsilhqot’in person.”44 So the subgroup responsible for the land is not
necessarily the holder of title thereto and other Aboriginal rights.
In the Court of Appeal, Justice Vickers’ decision on this issue was
challenged by British Columbia. The province argued that the Xeni Gwet’in
band was the proper title and rights holder because the “historical and
ethnographic evidence … established that decision-making typically took
place at the encampment or band level, and that while there were local
chiefs, the Tsilhqot’in did not have a national chief or political
organization.”45 Given these facts, the province contended that “the absence
of any traditional pan-Tsilhqot’in governance structure is fatal to any claim
on behalf of the Tsilhqot’in Nation.” 46 Justice Groberman, writing the
unanimous judgment of the Court of Appeal, responded to this argument as
follows:
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Ibid. at para. 469.
See Tsilhqot’in Nation, SCC, above note 7 at para. 6.
44
Tsilhqot’in Nation, BCSC, above note 29 at para. 468. See also para. 459.
45
Tsilhqot’in Nation, BCCA , above note 29 at para. 53.
46
Ibid. at para. 145. Interestingly, by making this argument British Columbia implicitly acknowledged that
there is an intimate connection between Aboriginal title and governance. On this, see note 32 above and
text accompanying notes 168-75 below.
43
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If the law adopted such a position, it might well be devastating
to claims by groups such as the Tsilhqot’in. The judge found
that Tsilhqot’in decision-making and governance traditionally
took place on a localized level, typically within family or
encampment groupings, depending on the season. Because of
the fluidity of the group structure and the limits of available
evidence, however, it would be impossible to trace those
localized collectives into modern counterparts. If Aboriginal
rights devolve only upon collectives that can show that they are
the modern successors of groups that had a clear decisionmaking structure, no one would be able to claim Aboriginal
rights on behalf of the Tsilhqot’in.47
Although Vickers J. had concluded that the Tsilhqot’in did not have a
national political structure, either historically or at the time of the trial,48
Groberman J.A. did not regard this as an impediment to finding that
Aboriginal title and rights are held by the Tsilhqot’in people as a whole.
While acknowledging the practical difficulties faced by the province in
fulfilling its duty to consult if Aboriginal title and rights are held by a nation
that lacks a national political structure with decision-making authority, he
agreed with Vickers J. that “the evidence clearly established that the holders
of Aboriginal rights within the Claim Area have traditionally defined
themselves as being the collective of all Tsilhqot’in people. The Tsilhqot’in
Nation, therefore, is the proper rights holder.”49 Commenting further on
British Columbia’s arguments on this issue, Groberman J.A. observed:
In my view, the position taken by British Columbia does not
take adequate account of the Aboriginal perspective with
respect to this matter. I agree with the trial judge’s conclusion
that the definition of the proper rights holder is a matter to be

47

Ibid. at para. 146.
See Tsilhqot’in Nation, BCSC, above note 29 at para. 456; Tsilhqot’in Nation, BCCA, above note 29 at
paras. 55, 140.
49
Tsilhqot’in Nation, BCCA, above note 29 at para. 150.
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determined primarily from the viewpoint of the Aboriginal
collective itself.50
Regarding the practical problem facing governments that have a legal
obligation to consult with Indigenous peoples who have claimed or
established Aboriginal title and rights, Groberman J.A. found that,
“[f]ortunately, the record in this case resolves the question of who speaks for
the Tsilhqot’in Nation” in relation to particular lands within their traditional
territory, specifically the Claim Area. 51 As the evidence showed that the
Xeni Gwet’in are the custodians or caretakers of that area, “they have a
special role in asserting those rights and in engaging with governments in
attempts to reconcile them with broader public interests.” 52
The decision of the Court of Appeal in Tsilhqot’in Nation was
appealed to the Supreme Court, which overturned Groberman J.A’s ruling
that Aboriginal title had not been proven and, for the first time in Canada,
issued a declaration of Aboriginal title.53 At the Supreme Court, British
Columbia apparently abandoned its contention – or at least did not argue the
point – that Aboriginal title and other rights are held by Indian Act bands
rather than nations.54 The decisions of Vickers J. and Groberman J.A. on this
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Ibid. at para. 149.
Ibid. at para.152.
52
Ibid. at para.156.
53
Tsilhqot’in Nation, SCC, above note 7. For collections of articles discussing the decision, see Special
Issue: Tsilhqot’in Nation v British Columbia (2015) 48:3 UBC L. Rev. 693-970; (2015) 71 Supreme Court
L. Rev. (2nd) 27-134.
54
This issue was not raised in the Factum of the Province of British Columbia submitted to the Supreme
Court, online: http://www.scc-csc.ca/WebDocuments-DocumentsWeb/34986/FM020_Respondents_HerMajesty-the-Queen-et-al.pdf. On the contrary, the province seems to have accepted Groberman J.A.’s
decision on this point, observing that, in his reasons, “[t]he Aboriginal perspective was at the forefront of
the recognition of the Tsilhqot’in as the collective that is the proper holder of Aboriginal rights”: ibid. at
para. 151.
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issue can therefore be taken as affirmed by the Supreme Court’s declaration
of title in favour of the Tsilhqot’in Nation as a whole. 55
The Supreme Court’s declaration of the Tsilhqot’in’s title raises an
interesting legal personality issue.56 The Court held in Delgamuukw, 57 and
affirmed in Tsilhqot’in Nation, 58 that Aboriginal title is a proprietary right.
In the common law, only natural persons (living human beings) and artificial
persons (corporations) have the legal personality necessary to hold property
rights.59 For this reason, unless provided with this capacity expressly or
implicitly by statute, collections of individuals, such as clubs and other
unincorporated associations, generally cannot own property in their own right;
instead, title is vested in all the members for the time being.60 It seems clear
from the cases we have already examined that Aboriginal title is not vested in
all the members of an Aboriginal nation as individuals; instead, it is a
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Tsilhqot’in Nation, SCC, above note 7 at para. 93: “with the declaration of title, the Tsilhqot’in have now
established Aboriginal title” [emphasis added]. See also Kwicksutaineuk/Ah-Kwa-Mish First Nation v.
Canada (Attorney General), [2012] 3 C.N.L.R. 148 (B.C.C.A.) [Kwicksutaineuk/Ah-Kwa-Mish First
Nation], especially at para. 77, deciding that Indian Act bands are not necessarily the proper entities to be
certified in a class action alleging infringement of Aboriginal fishing rights by fish farming in the
Broughton Archipelago. In a concurring judgment, Smith J.A. stated at para. 104: “While Aboriginal
fishing rights adhere to the Aboriginal entity asserting them, they are not personal rights of the individual
members of the Aboriginal entity; they do not exist independent of the entity. Rather they are collective
rights that are for the use and benefit of all of the members of the Aboriginal entity asserting them.”
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For further discussion, see “The Post-Delgamuukw Nature and Content of Aboriginal Title”, in Kent
McNeil, Emerging Justice? Essays on Indigenous Rights in Canada and Australia (Saskatoon: University
of Saskatchewan Native Law Centre, 2001), 102 at 122-27 [McNeil, “Post-Delgamuukw”].
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Delgamuukw, SCC, above note 5 at para. 113.
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Tsilhqot’in Nation, SCC, above note 7 at paras. 67-76, especially at para. 72 (“Analogies to other forms
of property ownership – for example, fee simple – may help us to understand aspects of Aboriginal title”)
and para. 73 (“Aboriginal title confers ownership rights similar to those associated with fee simple”)
[emphasis added].
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Even the Crown is regarded as a corporation for this purpose: see F.W. Maitland, “The Crown as
Corporation Sole” (1901) 17 L.Q. Rev. 131.
60
See generally Dennis Lloyd, The Law Relating to Unincorporated Associations (London: Sweet and
Maxwell Ltd., 1938); Harold A.J. Ford, Unincorporated Non-Profit Associations: Their Property and Their
Liability (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959); S.J. Stoljar, Groups and Entities: An Enquiry into Corporate Theory
(Canberra: Australian National University Press, 1973). Note that another option is for the legal title to be held
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communal right vested in the whole nation as a single legal entity.61 In other
words, apart from those Aboriginal nations that have been accorded the
capacity to hold property rights by statute and land claims agreements,62
Aboriginal nations that have Aboriginal title must, at common law, have the
legal personality necessary to have property rights.63 Moreover, as these
nations have communal decision-making authority over their lands, Aboriginal
title is not just proprietary – it is also governmental in nature.64 As Brian
Slattery has recently argued, this means that it is more akin to unencumbered
provincial title to land than it is to private real property rights.65
In summary, I think it is clear from the cases we have discussed that
Aboriginal title is held by Aboriginal nations or polities that are the
descendants or successors of the Aboriginal peoples that were in exclusive
occupation of their traditional territories at the time of Crown assertion of
sovereignty. 66 This is consistent with the jurisprudence on Aboriginal rights
61

See the quotation from Delgamuukw, SCC, accompanying note 26 above.
E.g. see the Nisga’a Final Agreement, initialled 4 August 1998, online: http://www.nnkn.ca/files/u28/niseng.pdf, ch. 11, s.5,: “The Nisga’a Nation, and each Nisga’a Village, is a separate and distinct legal entity,
with the capacity, rights, powers, and privileges of a natural person, including to … acquire and hold
property or an interest in property, and sell or otherwise dispose of that property or interest.”
63
Compare Kwicksutaineuk/Ah-Kwa-Mish First Nation, above note 55, where Garson J.A. stated at para.
79: “Because the term ‘aboriginal collective’ is not defined in the order or in the reasons for judgment, the
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because the Aboriginal collectives hold constitutional rights, they ought to be able to sue through this class
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decided it did not comprise a sufficiently precise class for the purposes of certification.
64
See note 32 above and accompanying text. See also Kent McNeil, “Indigenous Land Rights and SelfGovernment: Inseparable Entitlements”, in Lisa Ford and Tim Rowse, eds., Between Indigenous and Settler
Governance (Abingdon, U.K.: Routledge, 2013), 135; Andrée Boisselle, “To Dignity Through the Back
Door: Tsilhqot’in and the Aboriginal Title Test” (2015) 71 Supreme Court L. Rev. (2nd) 27; Gordon
Christie, “Who Makes Decisions over Aboriginal Title Lands?” (2015) 48 UBC L. Rev. 743.
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Slattery, “Constitutional Dimensions”, above note 28. See also McNeil, “Post-Delgamuukw”, above note
56 at 124-25; Webber, above note 32.
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177-80. Compare West Moberley First Nations v. McLeod Lake Indian Band, 2014 BCCA 283, 62
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apart from title that we will now examine. In examining these cases, it is
nonetheless important to keep in mind a fundamental distinction between
Aboriginal title and other Aboriginal rights. Aboriginal title is exclusive, so
except in situations where two or more Aboriginal nations share joint title,67
only one nation can have title to any particular land. 68 As exclusivity does
not appear to be a requirement for establishing other Aboriginal rights, proof
that one Aboriginal nation or polity has an Aboriginal right – to hunt or fish
in a particular place, for example – should not bar other Aboriginal groups
from establishing that they have such a right as well.69
2. Aboriginal Rights Cases 70
In many of the cases involving Aboriginal rights apart from title, at least
those that have reached the Supreme Court of Canada, the identity of the
rights holding entity does not appear to have been an issue. Most of these
B.C.L.R. (5th) 303, where the B.C. Court of Appeal upheld an order granting intervenor status to two
Indian Act bands (the Takla Lake First Nation and Tsay Keh Dene First Nation) and the Tahltan Central
Council, “a non-profit society representing the interests of the people of Tahltan ancestry” (para. 4),
because their claims to Aboriginal title and other rights in British Columbia gave them an interest in this
litigation to determine the western boundary of Treaty 8. However, as the decision dealt only with their
entitlement to intervenor status, I do not interpret it as an acknowledgement that they are the proper holders
of title and other rights (although decided just two weeks after Tsilhqot’in Nation, SCC, above note 7, that
case was not mentioned).
67
See McNeil, “Joint Aboriginal Title”, above note 32. Note that American law on Aboriginal title is also
discussed in this article at 838-52. See especially the analysis at 843-46 of the following cases involving the
identity of the title holding group: Confederated Tribes of the Warm Springs Reservation of Oregon v.
United States, 177 Ct. Cl. 184 (1966); Iowa Tribe of the Iowa Reservation v. United States, 195 Ct. Cl. 365
(1971); Turtle Mountain Band of Chippewa Indians v. United States, 490 F. 2d 935 (1974, Ct. Cl.).
68
See Delgamuukw, above note 5 at para. 155.
69
Ibid. at para. 159. This does not mean that Aboriginal resource use rights short of title can never be
exclusive. If the evidence showed, for example, that one Aboriginal nation fished in a certain lake and
excluded all other Aboriginal people from doing so, they could have an exclusive fishing right there,
though I would think that exclusion of others should be evidence of sufficient control to establish
Aboriginal title. See McNeil, “Joint Aboriginal Title”, above note 32 at 825-34.
70
In this Part, I look primarily at cases that reached the Supreme Court of Canada that I think are most
relevant to the issue of the title holding collective. A more thorough discussion would examine more
closely the numerous Aboriginal rights cases that did not reach the highest court, as well as Métis
Aboriginal rights cases, starting with Powley, above note 35: see Tsilhqot’in Nation, BCSC, above note 29
at paras. 441-44; Olthuis, above note 2 at 5, 21-25. Compare Tsilhqot’in Nation, BCCA, above note 29 at
para. 157. See also note 146 below.
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cases are prosecutions of First Nation individuals, in which it is sufficient for
the accused, in order to claim the benefit of an Aboriginal right, to be a
member of an Indian Act band or First Nation that has a connection to an
Aboriginal people whose practices, customs, or traditions gave rise to the
right at the time of contact with Europeans.71 Since the issue for the courts in
these cases is deciding whether the accused is entitled to the benefit of the
claimed Aboriginal right, it is generally not necessary for the judges to
specify precisely the collective entity that holds the right today. 72 Moreover,
to the extent that judges have revealed their thinking on this matter, they
have usually done so implicitly rather than explicitly. For these reasons,
these cases generally shed less light on the identity of the present-day rights
holders than the Aboriginal title cases we have already examined.
In addition, the pre-contact social and political organization of the
Aboriginal people in question usually does not seem to be a factor in the
judges’ view of the current rights holding entity. In the leading case of R. v.
Van der Peet, for example, the Supreme Court apparently accepted that the
Sto:lo people as a whole would today have the claimed Aboriginal right to
exchange fish for money or other goods (if proven, which the Court decided
it had not been), even though the Sto:lo had been “at a band level of social
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E.g. see R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075; Van der Peet, above note 38; R. v. N.T.C. Smokehouse
Ltd., [1996] 2 S.C.R. 672; R. v. Adams, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101 [Adams]; R. v. Côté, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 139.
Note that in R. v. Nikal, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 1013 at para. 95, Cory J., writing the majority judgment, observed
that “the nature and scope of aboriginal rights will frequently be dependant upon membership in particular
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quantities was upheld in R. v. Gladstone, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 723. See also Ahousaht Indian Band v. Canada
(Attorney General), 2009 BCSC 1494, [2010] 1 C.N.L.R. 1 [Ahousaht Indian Band, BCSC], discussed in
text accompanying notes 98-104 below.
72
See Ahousaht Indian Band, ibid. at para. 288.
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organization rather than at a tribal level” at the time of contact, 73 and are
now organized at the community level into eleven Indian Act bands. 74
The lack of any real analysis of the issue of the precise identity of the
current rights holding entity is particularly evident in cases where the right
was not established by the evidence. R. v. Pamajewon,75 for example,
involved appeals from convictions for unlawful gambling of members of
two Ojibwa (Anishinabek) Indian Act bands in Ontario, the Shawanaga and
Eagle Lake First Nations. They argued that these First Nations have an
inherent right of self-government that includes the authority to conduct and
regulate gambling activities on their reserve lands. The Supreme Court
applied the test for Aboriginal rights laid down by the Court just the day
before in Van der Peet,76 and upheld the convictions on the ground that the
evidence led by the accused failed to prove that high stakes gambling and
the regulation thereof had been integral to the distinctive culture of the
Ojibwa at the time of contact with Europeans. Chief Justice Lamer observed
that the accused relied “in support of their claim on the fact that the ‘Ojibwa
people ... had a long tradition of public games and sporting events, which
pre-dated the arrival of Europeans’,” 77 but he decided that the limited
evidence of this did not establish that it included high stakes gambling. He
concluded that the “evidence presented at both the Pamajewon and Gardner
trials does not demonstrate that gambling, or that the regulation of gambling,
was an integral part of the distinctive cultures of the Shawanaga or Eagle
Lake First Nations.”78 But as those First Nations are actually bands that owe
73

Van der Peet, above note 38 at para. 90.
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their legal existence to the Indian Act, it is questionable whether they could
ever meet the Van der Peet test by proving that they had distinctive cultures
at the time of contact with Europeans, which by virtue of the fur trade
probably occurred for the Ojibwa from whom they are descended long
before the Dominion of Canada was even created. Surely Lamer C.J.C.
meant that the Ojibwa people from whom they are descended would have
had to have a distinctive culture pre-contact that included the practice,
custom, or tradition of high stakes gambling. Whether the claimed
Aboriginal right, had it been proven in that way, would now be held by the
Shawanaga and Eagle Lake First Nations or by some other present-day
Ojibwa polity or polities does not appear to have been seriously considered
by the Court,79 no doubt because it was not necessary to identity the holders
of unestablished rights.
Mitchell v. Canada (Minister of National Revenue – M.N.R.)80
involved a claim by an individual member of a First Nation to the benefit of
an Aboriginal right, namely to bring goods for trade from the United States
into Canada without paying customs duties. Chief Justice McLachlin
described Grand Chief Mitchell as “a Mohawk of Akwesasne, a Mohawk
community located just west of Montreal, and a descendant of the Mohawk
nation, one of the polities comprising the Iroquois Confederacy prior to the
arrival of Europeans.” 81 The Supreme Court decided that the alleged right
had not been proven, as the evidence of “pre-contact Mohawk trading north
of the Canada-United States boundary” was “sparse and tenuous”, and
trading to the north that did take place was “clearly incidental, and not
79

Lamer C.J.C., ibid. at para. 24, “assum[ed] without deciding that s. 35(1) includes self-government
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integral, to the Mohawk culture.”82 In assessing the evidence of trade, the
Court’s focus was clearly on the Mohawk Nation as a whole, not just on the
Akwesasne community that is only one of the Mohawk First Nations in
Canada today. 83
R. v. Sappier; R. v. Gray84 involved prosecutions under provincial
legislation for unlawfully harvesting wood on Crown lands in New
Brunswick. The accused in Sappier are Maliseets and members of the
Woodstock First Nation, whereas the accused in Gray is Mi’kmaq and a
member of the Pabineau First Nation. In each case, the Supreme Court
decided that the accused had established that, as members of their respective
First Nations, they had an Aboriginal right to harvest timber for domestic
purposes because this practice had been integral to the Maliseet and
Mi’kmaq cultures prior to contact with Europeans. Although the Court found
that this right to harvest timber is site-specific, Justice Bastarache, in his
majority judgment, observed:
At the trial of Messrs. Sappier and Polchies, the Crown
conceded that “the issue of territoriality does not arise in the
trial of the Defendants on the charge set out herein” (Agreed
Statement of Facts at para. 12, reproduced in the trial decision
at p. 296). Moreover, in its reply to the defendants’ Notice of
Contention, the Crown addressed the question of whether the
harvesting of trees occurred within Crown lands traditionally
used for this practice. The Crown responded: “This question
would not appear to be an issue as wood was gathered at will
82

Ibid. at para. 3.
Compare the order of the Federal Court of Appeal (overturned by the Supreme Court), Mitchell v. M.N.R.
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within the traditional Maliseet territory” (reproduced in the
reasons of the Court of Appeal at para. 71). Territoriality is
therefore not at issue in the Sappier and Polchies prosecution.85
Regarding the Gray case, Bastarache J. noted that
… the trial judge accepted Mr. Sewell’s evidence that the
Mi’kmaq had traditionally used the Crown lands in question for
the purpose of tree harvesting. The Court of Appeal noted that
the Crown did not dispute this finding (para. 15).86
Yet after deciding that the Aboriginal right had been made out in each
case, Bastarache J. concluded:
The respondent Mr. Gray possesses an aboriginal right to
harvest wood for domestic uses on Crown lands traditionally
used for that purpose by members of the Pabineau First Nation.
The respondents Messrs. Sappier and Polchies possess an
aboriginal right to harvest wood for domestic uses. That right is
also site-specific, such that its exercise is necessarily limited to
Crown lands traditionally harvested by members of the
Woodstock First Nation.87
With all due respect, I find this conclusion difficult to reconcile with the
Crown’s admission in Sappier that “wood was gathered at will within the
traditional Maliseet territory” and the Court’s consequent conclusion that
“[t]erritoriality is therefore not at issue in the Sappier and Polchies
prosecution.” 88 Nor is it consistent with the undisputed “evidence that the
Mi’kmaq had traditionally used the Crown lands in question for the purpose
of tree harvesting.”89 There does not appear to have been any evidence (at
least not evidence referred to by the Supreme Court) that a Mi’kmaq
85
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subgroup connected to the present-day Pabineau First Nation or a Maliseet
subgroup connected to the current Woodstock First Nation even existed at
the time of contact, let alone restricted their wood harvesting to defined
portions of the Mi’kmaq and Maliseet territories. 90 Surely it would have
been more consistent with the evidence referred to by the Supreme Court to
conclude that Mr. Gray has an Aboriginal right to harvest wood wherever
the Mi’kmaq harvested pre-contact, and Messrs. Sappier and Polchies
likewise where the Maliseet harvested. 91
Unlike the other Aboriginal rights cases we have considered, Lax
Kw’alaams Indian Band v. Canada (Attorney General)92 did not involve a
prosecution. It was a representative action brought by “Chief Councillor
Garry Reece on his own behalf and on behalf of the members of the Lax
Kw’alaams Indian Band and others”93 for a declaration of their right to fish
commercially in designated waters along the coast of British Columbia.
Delivering the unanimous decision of the Supreme Court, Justice Binnie
described the action as “the claim of the Lax Kw’alaams First Nation and
other First Nations listed in the Appendix to these reasons (herein
collectively referred to as ‘Lax Kw’alaams’), whose ancestral lands stretch
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along the northwest coast of British Columbia between the estuaries of the
Nass and lower Skeena rivers, to the commercial harvesting and sale of ‘all
species of fish’ within their traditional waters.”94 Those First Nations are
apparently descended from the Coast Tsimshian people who inhabited that
region when the Europeans first arrived around 1793.95 The evidence led to
prove the Aboriginal right therefore related to the fishing practices, customs
and traditions of the Coast Tsimshian people as a whole prior to this
European contact. Regarding the identity of the current rights holders, the
statement of claim asked for “a declaration that the Lax Kw’alaams or, in the
alternative, each of the Allied Tsimshian Tribes, have existing aboriginal
rights”, but the trial judge restated this as an application for declarations that
“the plaintiffs have an existing Aboriginal right”. 96 Given the representative
nature of the action, the term “plaintiffs” may be vaguer than “Lax
Kw'alaams or, in the alternative, each of the Allied Tsimshian Tribes”, but
the precise identity of the current rights holders was never clarified because
the courts, all the way up to the Supreme Court, decided that the right to a
commercial fishery had not been proven. Binnie J. agreed with the trial
judge that the Coast Tsimshian’s pre-contact trade in eulachon grease did not
provide a sufficient basis for “a modern right to fish commercially all
species” in that people’s traditional territory. 97
Although not a case decided by the Supreme Court of Canada,
Ahousaht Indian Band v. Canada (Attorney General)98 deserves our
94
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Gitlutzau Tribe.
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See ibid. at para. 15: “The Lax Kw’alaams First Nation consists of the descendants of an ancient ‘fishing
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Ibid. at paras. 25-26.
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Ibid. at para. 30.
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Ahousaht Indian Band, BCSC, above note 71.
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attention because, like Lax Kw’alaams, it involved claims to commercial
fisheries (as well as Aboriginal title, which the court found it unnecessary to
address 99), and because the identity of the rights holders was a significant
issue at trial. The plaintiffs are five Indian Act bands, the Ehattesaht,
Mowachaht/Muchalaht,

Hesquiaht,

Ahousaht

and

Tla-o-qui-aht,

on

Vancouver Island. They claimed that,
… before and at the time of contact with Europeans, their
predecessors (collectively, the “Nuu-chah-nulth Nations”)
existed as organized and self-governing social and political
entities. They claim that the Nuu-chah-nulth Nations are
culturally related groups that share common distinctive features
including language, customs, practices, traditions, laws,
economies, spiritual beliefs and culture. After British
Columbia’s entry into Confederation in 1871, each of the Nuuchah-nulth Nations was constituted as a band under the
predecessor of the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.I-5, and, today,
each band is the legal representative of its predecessor Nation
and the lawful holder of the collective Aboriginal rights and
title of that Nation.100
Justice Garson stated that, in order to succeed in their Aboriginal
rights claims, the plaintiffs had to “establish that they are the successor
collectives to the Aboriginal groups that possessed Aboriginal rights at the
date of contact…. The question to be resolved is whether these modern
plaintiffs can prove that they are rights holders; that is, are they connected to
the groups from whom they say they derive their Aboriginal rights to fish
and to trade in fish.”101 Garson J. examined the relevant evidence at length in
her judgment, and concluded that each of the five bands had proven a
sufficient connection with the pre-contact Nuu-chah-nulth Nation, from
99

Ibid. at paras. 491-502.
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which they claimed to be descended, to be the present-day rights holders in
that Nation’s traditional territory. 102 She accordingly ordered, among other
things, that “[t]he plaintiffs have Aboriginal rights to fish for any species of
fish in the environs of their territories and to sell fish. The approximate
boundaries of each plaintiff’s territory is [sic] delineated in Appendix A and
further particularized for each plaintiff at Exhibit 26, with the exception of
the seaward boundary. The seaward boundary is nine miles from a line
drawn from headland to headland within each plaintiff’s territory.” 103 Justice
Garson’s decision was upheld by the B.C. Court of Appeal, with one
variation: geoduck clams were excluded from the plaintiffs’ Aboriginal
fishing rights because the Nuu-chah-nulth could not have engaged in this
modern, high-tech fishery at the time of contact.104
One other Supreme Court of Canada decision deserves to be
mentioned, even though it involved a claim to treaty rights rather than
Aboriginal rights, because the Court made some general statements about
rights holders that are applicable to both categories of rights. Behn v.
Moulton Contracting Ltd.105 was a tort action brought by a forestry company
against members of the Behn family, who belong to the Fort Nelson First
Nation (FNFN) in British Columbia, for blockading a logging road
providing access to an area where the company had been granted timber
harvesting licences by the province. The defendants argued that the licences
were invalid because the province had not consulted with them prior to
102
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2011 BCCA 237, [2011] 3 C.N.L.R. 1, affirmed on rehearing, 2013 BCCA 300, [2013] 4 C.N.L.R 31.
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issuing the licences and because the licences infringed their treaty hunting
and trapping rights. The company responded by arguing that the Behns
lacked standing to raise the issues of consultation and treaty rights as
defences because the rights are held by the FNFN, not by individual
members or families. 106 The Behns’ answer to this was summarized by
Justice LeBel, who delivered the Court’s unanimous judgment, as follows:
They recognize that these rights have traditionally been held by
the FNFN, which is a party to Treaty No. 8. But they also
allege that specific tracts of land have traditionally been
assigned to and associated with particular family groups. They
assert in their pleadings that the Authorizations granted to
Moulton are for logging in specific areas within the territory
traditionally assigned to the Behns, where they have exercised
their rights to hunt and trap.107
The Supreme Court decided that raising the consultation and treaty
rights defences in this action was an abuse of process because the FNFN and
the Behns had notice of the licences and should have challenged their
validity in an action for judicial review before the company started work.
The Court therefore declined to rule on the treaty rights issue, but Justice
106

For other cases involving the issue of standing in relation to treaty rights, see Komoyue Heritage Society
v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 2006 BCSC 1517 [Komoyue Heritage Society]; Kelly v. Canada
(Attorney General), 2013 ONSC 1220, [2013] 3 C.N.L.R. 333. In Kelly, an action alleging that the
government of Canada has not fulfilled its obligations in Treaty 3 in relation to education, Perell J. stated:
“Aboriginal rights are communal rights, but the rights holder, i.e., the aboriginal group that shares the right
may be a family, a clan, a descent group, a hunting party, an encampment, a band, a tribe, a confederacy or
a first nation…. Aboriginal rights and treaty rights are collective rights, and the proper party with the
standing to assert an aboriginal rights claim or a treaty rights claim is the collective that is the rights
holder.” In this representative action, Perell J. opined at para. 121 that, if the matter were justiciable (which
he decided it was not), the plaintiff chief would be “able to bring a representative action on behalf of the
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band council resolutions); or (2) if he joins as party defendants those bands that do not authorize his
representation action.” The Ontario Court of Appeal reversed Perell J.s decision that the action was not
justiciable, and agreed that the representative action could go ahead if the conditions he imposed were met:
2014 ONCA 92 at para. 21. See also Kelly v. Ontario (Minister of Energy), 2014 ONSC 5492, [2015] 1
C.N.L.R. 206, Perell J.at para.19: “Aboriginal and treaty rights are communal rights and belong to
communities that may be comprised of families, clans, descent groups, hunting parties, a band, a tribe, a
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LeBel did make some general comments about the holders of Aboriginal and
treaty rights that are relevant to our discussion:
Aboriginal and treaty rights are collective in nature: see R. v.
Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075, at p. 1112; Delgamuukw,
[above note 5] at para. 115; R. v. Sundown, [1999] 1 S.C.R.
393, at para. 36; R. v. Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 533, at paras.
17 and 37; R. v. Sappier, 2006 SCC 54, [2006] 2 S.C.R. 686, at
para. 31; Beckman, [Beckman v. Little Salmon/Carmacks First
Nation, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 103] at para. 35. However, certain
rights, despite being held by the Aboriginal community, are
nonetheless exercised by individual members or assigned to
them. These rights may therefore have both collective and
individual aspects. Individual members of a community may
have a vested interest in the protection of these rights. 108
After declining to try to categorize Aboriginal and treaty rights any more
precisely along collective and individual lines, LeBel J. concluded:
… on the occasion of this appeal and at this stage of the
development of the law, … [i]t will suffice to acknowledge
that, despite the critical importance of the collective aspect of
Aboriginal and treaty rights, rights may sometimes be assigned
to or exercised by individual members of Aboriginal
communities, and entitlements may sometimes be created in
their favour. In a broad sense, it could be said that these rights
might belong to them or that they have an individual aspect
regardless of their collective nature. Nothing more need be said
at this time. 109
It is clear from the cases we have already examined that individuals
can successfully rely on Aboriginal rights as a defence to prosecutions. One
would therefore think that they should be able to rely on those rights in civil
cases as well. Be that as it may, our concern in this discussion paper is the
identity of the current holders of collective rights. In Behn, it seems to have
108
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been assumed that the FNFN, an Indian Act band, is the holder of those
rights in the area where the logging was taking place. 110 However, treaty
rights are different from Aboriginal rights in this regard because the treaty
records and documents provide direct evidence of the Aboriginal parties,
whereas the identity of the Aboriginal peoples whose practices, customs, and
traditions form the basis for Aboriginal rights depends more generally on
historical, ethnographic, and other sources of evidence. As a result, and
because the treaties are usually closer in time to the present, it is often easier
to make a connection between parties who entered into the treaties and the
present-day holders of collective treaty rights than it is to make a connection
between Aboriginal peoples at the time of contact and the holders of
Aboriginal rights today. 111
This brief survey of some of the Supreme Court decisions involving
claims by First Nations to Aboriginal rights apart from title reveals that the
Court’s approach has generally been to determine whether the individuals
claiming the benefit of the right are members of a First Nation or Indian
band today that has a connection with an Aboriginal people for whom the
practice, custom, or tradition on which the alleged right is based was integral
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See note 117 below. See also Fort Nelson First Nation v. British Columbia (Environmental Assessment
Office), 2015 BCSC 1180, [2015] 4 C.N.L.R. 104, where Davies J. held that the province owes a duty to
consult to the FNFN in relation to the development of a sand and gravel pit within their traditional territory.
111
The Supreme Court has refused to impose too high a standard for establishing such a connection in the
case of treaty rights. In R. v. Simon, [1985] 2 S.C.R 387 at 407, Dickson C.J.C., delivering the unanimous
judgment, responded to the Crown’s argument that the appellant had “not shown that he is a direct
descendant of a member of the original Micmac Indian Band covered by the Treaty of 1752” (the treaty the
appellant relied upon as a defence to the charge of unlawful hunting): “In my view, the appellant has
established a sufficient connection with the Indian band, signatories to the Treaty of 1752. As noted earlier,
this Treaty was signed by Major Jean Baptiste Cope, Chief of the Shubenacadie Micmac tribe, and three
other members and delegates of the tribe. The Micmac signatories were described as inhabiting the eastern
coast of Nova Scotia. The appellant admitted at trial that he was a registered Indian under the Indian Act,
and was an ‘adult member of the Shubenacadie-Indian Brook Band of Micmac Indians and was a member
of the Shubenacadie Band Number 02’. The appellant is, therefore, a Shubenacadie-Micmac Indian, living
in the same area as the original Micmac Indian tribe, party to the Treaty of 1752. This evidence alone, in
my view, is sufficient to prove the appellant’s connection to the tribe originally covered by the Treaty.”
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to their distinctive culture at the time of contact with Europeans. The Court
does not appear to be too concerned with precise definition of the rights
holding entity, either at the time of contact or in the present day. As long as
there is a sufficient connection between the relevant Aboriginal people at
contact and the current Aboriginal community to which the individuals
belong, that seems to meet the continuity requirement for the claimants of
the Aboriginal right today. However, where the individuals are members of a
subgroup within a larger entity such as an Aboriginal nation, it does not
mean that the subgroup is the holder of the right. 112 For example, if Dorothy
Van der Peet had been able to establish an Aboriginal right to exchange fish
for money or other goods in Van der Peet, it seems that all members of the
Sto:lo Nation, not just members of the Sto:lo band or First Nation to which
she belongs, would have the benefit of that right today. Similarly, if Chief
Mitchell had been able to prove the trading right in the Mitchell case,
presumably all Mohawk communities in Canada, not just the Mohawks of
Akwesasne, would be the holders of the right.113
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Though Sappier/Gray, above note 84, may appear inconsistent with this conclusion, as discussed above
in the text accompanying notes 85-91 I think there are problems with this aspect of the decision. The
Court’s concern seems to have been to limit the territorial scope of the wood harvesting right, but in so
doing I think the judges did not take sufficient account of the admissions and evidence regarding the
identity of the Aboriginal peoples – the Maliseet and Mi’kmaq peoples – whose pre-contact activities gave
rise to the harvesting right. With respect, I think Bastarache J.’s leap in logic in this regard is evident in the
following passage at para. 53 of his judgment: “In the Gray trial, the trial judge accepted Mr. Sewell’s
evidence that the Mi’kmaq had traditionally used the Crown lands in question for the purpose of tree
harvesting. The Court of Appeal noted that the Crown did not dispute this finding (para. 15). I would
conclude on this basis that Mr. Gray has established an Aboriginal right to harvest wood for domestic uses
on Crown lands traditionally used for this purpose by members of the Pabineau First Nation” [emphasis
added]. How, one might ask, does the factual finding that “the Mi’kmaq had traditionally used the Crown
lands in question for the purpose of tree harvesting” get transformed into a conclusion relating to “Crown
lands traditionally used for this purpose by members of the Pabineau First Nation”?
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Similarly, in Adams, above note 71, the accused, also an Akwesasne Mohawk, was found to have an
Aboriginal right to fish for food in Lake St. Francis in Quebec because fishing there was integral to the
distinctive culture of the Mohawks prior to contact with Europeans. Nothing in Lamer C.J.C.’s decision
suggests that only the Mohawks of Akwesasne have this right. At para. 34, he stated: “The appellant argues
that the Mohawks have an aboriginal right to fish in Lake St. Francis. In order to succeed in this argument
the appellant must demonstrate that, pursuant to the test laid out by this Court in Van der Peet, fishing in
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So far we have examined cases where a claim to Aboriginal title or
some other Aboriginal right was asserted and an attempt was made to prove
that title or right in court. In other cases, title and other rights are claimed,
not in order to get a court declaration of their existence or as a defence
against prosecution, but rather to force governments to consult with the
Indigenous people concerned before resource development or other activity,
such as the building of dams or infrastructure, goes ahead in their territory.
These cases raise the issue of determining whom governments need to
consult with in specific instances, which of course depends on the identity of
the collectives claiming Aboriginal title or rights at the time when
consultation must take place. We will now examine some of these cases.
3. Duty to Consult Cases114
In the leading case of Haida Nation v. British Columbia,115 the Supreme
Court decided that the Crown (in this case the Crown in right of the
province) has a constitutional duty to consult with Aboriginal peoples when
it contemplates action that might have some adverse impact on their
Aboriginal rights, even if those rights have only been claimed but not yet
established in court or acknowledged by a historical treaty or modern land
claims agreement. The Court found that British Columbia had not consulted
with the Haida people when it modified a tree farm licence that permitted
harvesting of timber on Haida Gwaii (formerly the Queen Charlotte Islands)
and when it later transferred the licence to another forestry company. This

Lake St. Francis was ‘an element of a practice, custom or tradition integral to the distinctive culture’ of the
Mohawks. For the reasons given below, I am of the view that the appellant has satisfied this test.”
114
The discussion in this Part is limited to selective Aboriginal title and rights cases, and so does not
consider cases involving treaty rights.
115
[2004] 3 S.C.R. 511 [Haida Nation, SCC].
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decision, along with Taku River Tlingit First Nation v. British Columbia,116
a companion case decided the same day, set the stage for a stream of duty to
consult cases in British Columbia and elsewhere in Canada. No attempt will
be made in this discussion paper to provide anything like a comprehensive
survey of these numerous cases. Instead, we will focus on a few selected
decisions that cast some light on the identity of the rights holders or
claimants with whom consultation must take place. For as Justice LeBel
stated in the Behn decision,
[t]he duty to consult exists to protect the collective rights of
Aboriginal peoples. For this reason, it is owed to the Aboriginal
group that holds the s.35 rights, which are collective in
nature…. But an Aboriginal group can authorize an individual
or an organization to represent it for the purpose of asserting its
s.35 rights. 117
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[2004] 3 S.C.R. 550 [Taku River].
Behn, above note 31 at para. 30. As authority, LeBel J. cited Komoyue Heritage Society, above note 106.
See also Behn at para. 31: “given the absence of an allegation of an authorization from the FNFN [Fort
Nelson First Nation], in the circumstances of this case, the Behns cannot assert a breach of the duty to
consult on their own, as that duty is owed to the Aboriginal community, the FNFN.” See also Beckman v.
Little Salmon/Carmacks First Nation, [2010] 3 S.C.R. 103 at para. 35. In John Voortman & Associates
Limited v. The Haudenosaunee Confederacy Chiefs Council, [2009] 3 C.N.L.R. 117 at para. 73 (Ont. S.C.),
Henderson J. decided that no duty to consult was owed to Haudenosaunee Men’s Fire of Grand River
(HMF) in relation to a land claim because “the HMF is not well defined and its authority to represent
Aboriginal people is not well established.” Similarly, in Fond du Lac Denesuline First Nation v. Canada
(Attorney General), 2010 FC 948, [2010] 4 C.N.L.R. 1 at para. 163 (affirmed, without addressing this issue,
2012 FCA 7, 430 N.R. 190), Russell J. decided that “Camsell Portage, Uranium City, Stony Rapids and
Wollaston Lake [municipalities in northern Saskatchewan] may well have Aboriginal residents and
connections to Aboriginal communities, but these entities themselves do not enjoy section 35 rights.
Counsel for the Applicants has explained that these entities are being used in a convenient representative
capacity for the Aboriginal members of their respective communities, but there is nothing before the Court
to show how they acquired this representative capacity and whether they are truly authorized to make this
application on behalf of the Aboriginal members of their communities. Consequently, in so far as this
application depends upon section 35 rights and the duty of the Crown to consult with Aboriginal groups or
persons, Camsell Portage, Uranium City, Stony Rapids and Wollaston Lake have not established that they
have standing.” See also Native Council of Nova Scotia v. Canada (Attorney General), 2007 FC 45, [2007]
2 C.N.L.R. 233 at paras. 42-44 (affirmed 2008 FCA 113, [2008] 3 C.N.L.R. 286, without addressing this
issue), where Layden-Stevenson J. was willing to assume that the Native Council of Nova Scotia (NCNS)
could represent Mi’kmaq and other Aboriginal persons living off-reserve in Nova Scotia in consultations in
relation to their alleged Aboriginal right to fish. He stated at para. 43: “Because the off-reserve Aboriginal
population of Nova Scotia chose the NCNS to represent them in their dealings with DFO [Department of
Fisheries and Oceans], the NCNS (as an organization) holds the procedural right of consultation while its
individual members hold the substantive right to fish.” However, because there was a paucity of evidence
117
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In the Haida Nation case itself, the style of cause described the
plaintiffs as the “Council of the Haida Nation and Guujaaw, on their own
behalf and on behalf of all members of the Haida Nation”. 118 The portion of
the declaration of the B.C. Court of Appeal that was affirmed by the
Supreme Court declared that the Crown in right of the province has “a
legally enforceable duty to the Haida people to consult with them in good
faith and to endeavour to seek workable accommodations between the
Aboriginal interests of the Haida people, on the one hand, and the short term
and long term objectives of the Crown”.119 In the Supreme Court judgment,
the duty is said to be owed to the “Haida people”, or just the “Haida”, as
they are the people with a strong claim to Aboriginal title and other
Aboriginal rights. Writing the unanimous judgment, Chief Justice
McLachlin observed: “The Haida have claimed title to all of Haida Gwaii
for at least 100 years.” 120
The website of the Haida Nation states:
The Haida Nation collectively holds Hereditary and Aboriginal
Title and Rights to Haida Territories and the cultural and
intellectual property rights of the Haida Nation. All people of
Haida ancestry are citizens of the Haida Nation. Every Haida
citizen has the right of access to all Haida Gwaii resources for
cultural reasons, and for food or commerce consistent with the
Laws of Nature as reflected in the laws of the Haida Nation. 121

of the alleged right for members of the NCNS other than Mi’kmaq members, the NCNS could not claim it
was owed a duty to consult on behalf of all its members.
118
Haida Nation, SCC, above note 115, style of cause. Guujaaw was the President of the Council of the
Haida Nation at the time: see CBC News, “Innovative Haida leader Guujaaw steps aside”, 11 December
2012, online: http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/innovative-haida-leader-guujaaw-stepsaside-1.1200975.
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Haida Nation v. British Columbia, [2002] 2 C.N.L.R. 121 at para. 60.
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Haida Nation, SCC, above note 115 at para. 65,
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Online: http://www.haidanation.ca/Pages/history/haidanation.html. Legal expression of this is in the
Constitution of the Haida Nation, Art. 3, online:
http://www.haidanation.ca/Pages/governance/pdfs/HN%20Constitution%20Revised%20Oct%202014_offic
ial%20unsigned%20copy.pdf.
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In affirming that the duty to consult is owed to the Haida people, the
Supreme Court’s judgment is consistent with the Haida’s own assertion that
the whole Haida Nation has a collective right to their lands and resources
that can be accessed by every Haida citizen. Distribution of governmental
authority within the Haida Nation therefore does not affect and is not
relevant to the identity of the title and rights holder, which is the Haida
people collectively rather than a governing body. 122 However, according to
Justice LeBel in the Behn decision, the Haida people can delegate authority
to a governing body or individuals to represent them in consultations in
relation to their Aboriginal title and other rights. In my opinion, such a
delegation would be an exercise of the Haida Nation’s governance authority
over their title and other rights.123
In the Taku River case, the Supreme Court held unanimously that the
Taku River Tlingit First Nation (TRTFN), an Indian Act band, “have prima
facie Aboriginal rights and title over at least some of the area that they
claim”, 124 and consequently the province owed them a duty to consult in
relation to construction of a road through their traditional territory. The
Court noted that the province clearly had notice of the claims of the TRTFN,
as they had been attempting to negotiate their land claim with Canada since
1983 and with British Columbia after the B.C. Treaty Commission was
established in 1993.125 While it is not clear from the judgment that the
TRTFN had received authority from the members of the TRTFN to negotiate
the land claim and challenge the construction of the road, this was likely
122

The Constitution of the Haida Nation, ibid., provides for governmental authority to be distributed among
the Council of the Haida Nation, the Hereditary Chiefs’ Council, and two village councils, Old Massett
Village Council and Skidegate Band Council. The village councils are Indian Act band councils: see First
Nation Profiles Interactive Map, online: http://fnpim-cippn.aandc-aadnc.gc.ca/index-eng.html.
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See note 32 and accompanying text above.
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Ibid. at para. 26.
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assumed, especially as the style of cause indicates that the action was
brought by the “Taku River Tlingit First Nation and Melvin Jack, on behalf
of himself and all other members of the Taku River Tlingit First Nation”.126
Comparing Haida Nation and Taku River, we see that in the former
case the duty to consult was owed to the Haida people as a whole, not to
their governing bodies which include two Indian Act band councils, whereas
in Taku River the duty was owed to the TRTFN, an Indian Act band. In
neither case does the identity of the claimants to Aboriginal rights and title
seem to have been an issue. Instead, the Supreme Court appears to have
simply assumed that the claimants had the authority that they asserted by
bringing the proceeding. 127 It would therefore seem that, unless someone
challenges the authority of the Aboriginal people or polity claiming to be
owed a duty to consult, judges usually will not raise the issue themselves by
questioning that authority. 128
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Ibid., style of cause.
See also Rio Tinto Alcan Inc. v. Carrier Sekani Tribal Council, [2010] 2 S.C.R. 650, where the Carrier
Sekani Tribal Council (CSTC) alleged that its member tribes have Aboriginal rights and title in the
Nechako River watershed in British Columbia, giving rise to a duty to consult in relation to sale of
electricity from a hydroelectric facility built on the river in the 1950s. While the Supreme Court held that
there was no duty to consult in relation to the sale of electricity because it would not have a new adverse
impact on the claimed rights, it did not question the authority of the CSTC to bring the action.
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E.g. see Ktunaxa Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests, Lands and Natural Resource
Operations), 2014 BCSC 568, [2014] 4 C.N.L.R. 143, aff’d 2015 BCCA 352, [2015] 4 C.N.L.R. 199, leave
to appeal granted by the S.C.C., 17 March 2016. Compare the cases cited in note 117 above. See also
Hamlet of Clyde River, above note 2, where a challenge to standing of the Nammautaq Hunters & Trappers
Organization -- Clyde River to represent the collective rights holding body under the Nunavut Land Claims
Agreement in a duty to consult case was dealt with by the court granting that organization public interest
standing. Leave to appeal this decision was granted by the Supreme Court on March 10, 2016. Though not
a case where such a challenge was made, Halalt First Nation v. British Columbia (Minister of
Environment), 2012 BCCA 191, involving applications for intervenor status in a duty to consult case,
reveals another situation in which this issue could arise. The Cowichan Tribes, who are members of the
Hul’qumi’num Treaty Group (HTG), to which the Halalt First Nation (the plaintiff in the case) also
belongs, argued that “the strength-of-claim assessment required by the duty to consult must include
consideration of which present-day Aboriginal community is likely the proper rights holder. It says if that
issue had been considered in this case, the Province would not have erred in concluding that the Halalt’s
aboriginal title claim to the well sites was weak. It submits that the Province should have recognised that
the HTG member communities as a group are the likely proper rights holders of a strong claim to
Aboriginal title” (para. 25). Smith J.A. denied intervenor status to the Cowichan Tribes without discussion
127

37

While not attempting a comprehensive survey, it is worth examining a
couple of lower court decisions where the issue of the identity of the
Aboriginal title or rights claimants did arise.129 Nlaka’pamux Nation Tribal
Council v. Griffin 130 involved the duty to consult in relation to a proposal to
extend a landfill site that could have an adverse impact on Aboriginal rights
and title. As the landfill site was on or close to the boundary between the
traditional territories of two Aboriginal nations, the Secwepemc Nation
(formerly called the Shuswap Nation) and the Nlaka’pamux Nation
(formerly called the Thompson River Nation), and the plaintiff Nlaka’pamux
Nation Tribal Council (NNTC) represented some but not all of the Indian
Act bands belonging to the Nlaka’pamux Nation, a question arose as to
whether a duty to consult was owed to the NNTC. On this application for
judicial review, Justice Sewell said this:
What is the government to do when faced with a diversity of
putative representation on behalf of a First Nation. In my view,
the government must discharge its duty to consult by taking
reasonable steps to ensure that all points of view within a First
Nation are given appropriate consideration.131
While making a preliminary assessment that the Nlaka’pamux Nation’s
Aboriginal title claim at the location of the proposed landfill extension was
weak, Sewell J. nonetheless decided that a duty to consult was owed to the
NNTC, even though one of the bands within the NNTC opposed its position

of the issue of the proper rights holder, as “[t]his issue is being proposed for the first time on appeal and, in
any event, could be advanced by Halalt if it so wishes” (para. 30).
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For other case references and very useful discussion, see Kerry Wilkins, “Aboriginal Law: The Duty to
Consult: To Whom Is the Duty Owed”, Ontario CED, 4th ed. (Toronto: Carswell, 2008-), vol. 1, title 2 at
§10; Janna Promislow, “Consultation Update: Emerging and Persistent Issues”, paper delivered at the
Constitutional Law Symposium, co-sponsored by the Legal Education Society of Alberta and the Centre for
Constitutional Studies, University of Alberta, 28 September 2012 [unpublished], at 25-31; Dwight G.
Newman, Revisiting the Duty to Consult Aboriginal Peoples (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 2014), 65-71.
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on the extension of the landfill site and challenged its authority to represent
the Nlaka’pamux people in this matter. 132 Justice Sewell avoided the internal
disagreement by deciding that a duty to consult was also owed to the
dissenting band.
In Campbell v. British Columbia (Minister of Forests and Range),133
the petitioners sought an interim injunction to stop logging pending judicial
review of a licence issued by the province to Sunshine Logging Ltd.,
permitting it to harvest timber from four cut blocks on Perry Ridge between
the Slocan and Little Slocan rivers in southern British Columbia, in an area
entirely within the territory over which the Sinixt people claim Aboriginal
title. The petitioners, who are directors of the Sinixt Nation Society, a
representative body of the Sinixt Nation, brought the action on their own
behalf and on behalf of the Sinixt Nation and the Sinixt Nation Society. 134
The judgment relates to an application by the defendant Minister for an
order dismissing the petition on the ground that “the petitioners are without
authority to advance the claims or obtain the relief sought, and that they lack
the requisite standing to bring the petition.” 135 Justice Willcock noted that
“[t]his is as much a challenge to the claim of the collective on behalf of
whom the petitioners purport to act as a challenge to the capacity or fitness
of the individual petitioners to act for that collective.”136 He observed that
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“[i]t is common ground that the rights asserted by the petitioners are
collective rights and that legal action brought to determine or enforce those
rights must be brought on behalf of a group that is capable of advancing a
claim under s.35 of the Constitution Act, 1982.”137
The Aboriginal title claim of the Sinixt people, upon which the
alleged breach of the duty to consult depended in this case, is uncommon
among claims by First Nations in Canada, in that these people do not
currently have federally acknowledged status as an Indian Act band or
bands. There was, however, no real question of their existence as an
Aboriginal people prior to the arrival of Europeans. Justice Willcock
observed:
The evidence before me is that a relatively distinct aboriginal
population made use of and occupied land between the
Monashee and Selkirk Mountains, from the Kettle River north
to the area of present-day Revelstoke, for a period of
approximately 3,500 years, up to the time of contact with
European explorers and settlers. The record also establishes
that following contact, the Sinixt’s numbers in Canada were
reduced by disease and their gradual displacement south into
the United States. 138
Tragically, the Sinixt never recovered from the decimation caused by a
smallpox epidemic in the late 1700s. By the early 20th century, most of their
members had gone to live in the United States, particularly on the Colville
Indian Reservation that had been created in 1872 in what became
Washington State. Although a reserve at Oakscott in British Columbia was
created for the Arrow Lakes Band of Sinixt by the Canadian government in
1915, by 1924 apparently only eight members of this band remained. After
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the last registered member, Annie Joseph, died on October 1, 1953, the
federal government declared the Arrow Lakes Band to be extinct and
transferred the reserve lands at Oatscott to British Columbia. 139 Justice
Willcock noted that the
Arrow Lakes Band appears to have been the only Indian band
in British Columbia history to have been declared extinct by
Canada and have its reserve land revert to the province.
However, Sinixt individuals were and are living among and as
members of the Osoyoos, Penticton, and Okanagan Bands of
the Okanagan Nation Alliance, in Washington State as
members of the Lakes Tribe of the Colville Confederacy, and
off reservation in Canada and the United States. 140
The problem for the petitioners was proving the existence of a
present-day identifiable claimant group that they represent. Unfortunately,
the evidence regarding the continuing existence of a distinct Sinixt people
was inconsistent. There were also “competing claims to speak for the
contemporary manifestation of the historic rights-bearing group.”141 The
Sinixt Nation Society, to which the petitioners belong, was incorporated in
2006 to provide education about the history, culture, and traditions of the
Sinixt people in British Columbia and to promote their interests. Counsel for
the petitioners nonetheless “acknowledged that the Society cannot claim or
enforce an aboriginal right or title and is not entitled to an injunction.
Evidence of the existence of the Society and its role is put before the court
solely as evidence of the composition of the Sinixt Nation and recognition of
the individual named petitioners as representatives of that organization or
collective.” 142 But the evidence did not disclose clear criteria for
139
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membership in the Society or reveal how individuals become members, nor
was its authority to represent the Sinixt as a whole accepted by all interested
parties, matters that obviously bothered Justice Willcock. He decided that, in
order to have standing to bring a representative action, the petitioners had to
“clearly define a distinct aboriginal collective by objective criteria, so that
their claim that a collective with rights-bearing attributes exists and their
claim to be the appropriate representatives of that collective can be
adjudicated upon.”143 He found that they had failed to do so, and as a result
he dismissed their petition because it had not been properly brought as a
representative action. This decision was plainly based on lack of adequate
evidence, as Justice Willcock said he would have reserved judgment pending
a hearing of an application to produce additional evidence, “if an application
had been brought and if there was a prospect that further evidence could
address the deficiencies in the representative case.” 144 An application to
appeal this decision was dismissed by B.C. Court of Appeal as moot because
the logging the petitioners were trying to prevent had already been
completed by the time the appeal reached that court! 145
The Campbell case reveals that, in situations where the present-day
existence of an Aboriginal collective that holds or claims Aboriginal rights
or title is in doubt, the onus is on the Aboriginal claimants to prove both its
existence and its connection with the historical community from whom the
rights or title are derived. 146 If the representative capacity of the plaintiffs in
143
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an Aboriginal title, rights, or duty to consult case is challenged, as it was by
the Minister in Campbell, the decision also suggests that the plaintiffs might
have to prove that they have the authority to bring the action on behalf of the
present-day collective that holds or claims the title or rights. 147 However, in
our examination of Nlaka’pamux Nation we saw that Justice Sewell took a
more generous approach where the duty to consult is concerned, ruling that
“the government must discharge its duty to consult by taking reasonable
steps to ensure that all points of view within a First Nation are given
appropriate consideration”, 148 and this aspect of his decision was upheld by
the Court of Appeal.149 Significantly, Justice Willcock cited the Court of
Appeal’s decision in Nlaka’pamux Nation,150 without remarking any
discrepancy between the flexible approach to representative capacity in that
case and his own approach.
In summary, our examination of the duty to consult cases that are
most relevant to the identity of Aboriginal rights and title holders or
claimants reveals that Canadian courts have not yet established clear
guidelines for addressing this issue. However, we know from the Supreme
Court’s decision in Behn that the duty to consult is owed to the collective
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that holds or asserts the rights or title. 151 It is therefore necessary to define
the contemporary collective, as was held in Campbell 152 – though how
precisely remains to be seen – and show its connection with the pre-contact
or pre-sovereignty collective from whom the claimed rights or title are
derived.153 Also, the organization or individuals who claim that the duty is
owed to them as representatives of the rights or title holding collective must
have the authority to act in that capacity on behalf of the collective.154 In
instances where a subgroup within the collective is the custodian or
caretaker of the rights or title in question, that subgroup may be able to
engage in consultation on behalf of the collective, as Groberman J.A.
suggested in the Court of Appeal decision in Tsilhqot’in Nation. 155 The cases
we have examined also reveal that, if unquestioned, the requisite authority is
usually assumed from the circumstances, but when challenged it has to be
established by evidence.156 But the Nlaka’pamux Nation decision suggests
that, where there are divisions among the rights or title holders or claimants,
the duty to consult may be owed to more than one organization representing
different interests within the collective. 157
4. Conclusions: From Title and Rights to Governance
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Our examination of relevant case law has revealed that Aboriginal rights and
title are communal rights vested in present-day collectives that are connected
by descent or succession to the Indigenous people whose practices, customs,
and traditions are the source of specific Aboriginal rights, or who were in
exclusive occupation of land giving rise to title at the time of Crown
assertion of sovereignty. While the specific rights cases discussed in Part 2
do shed some light on the issue of the identity of rights holders, the fact that
most of those cases involved prosecution of individuals has meant that
precise identification of the rights holding collective was usually
unnecessary. The Aboriginal title cases discussed in Part 1 – especially the
Tsilhqot’in Nation decision – while less numerous are nonetheless more
illuminating because, apart from Marshall/Bernard, they involved civil
actions for declarations of title on behalf of Aboriginal collectives. The duty
to consult cases discussed in Part 3 are also germane to this discussion, but
we have seen that this duty, while owed to rights and title holders or
claimants, can be fulfilled by consultation with organizations or individuals
that have been authorized by rights or title holders or claimants to represent
them. In cases where this authority is not questioned, the precise identity of
the proper rights or title holders or claimants themselves is not always
apparent.
Our analysis of the trial and Court of Appeal decisions in Tsilhqot’in
Nation revealed that the judges engaged directly with the issue of the
identity of rights and title holders, and decided that the current holder of
Aboriginal rights and title is the Tsilhqot’in Nation as a whole, not Indian
Act bands. This conclusion, which does not appear to have been challenged
by any of the parties on appeal to the Supreme Court, was implicitly
affirmed by the Court’s declaration of the Tsilhqot’in Nation’s Aboriginal
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title. However, I do not understand this to mean that rights and title will be
vested in Aboriginal nations in every instance; instead, it depends on the
evidence. At trial in Tsilhqot’in Nation, Justice Vickers stated that the
inquiry into the identity of the rights and title holders “is primarily a matter
of fact to be determined on the whole of the evidence relating to the specific
society or culture.” 158 He found that the “Tsilhqot’in people were the historic
community of people sharing language, customs, traditions, historical
experience, territory and resources at the time of first contact and at
sovereignty assertion.” 159 Any rights of individuals or subgroups were
derived from the collective actions, traditions, and experience of the
Tsilhqot’in Nation. 160 As for the holders of present-day rights and title,
Vickers J. found as a fact that
Tsilhqot’in people make no distinction amongst themselves at
the band level as to their individual right to harvest resources.
The evidence is that, as between Tsilhqot’in people, any person
in the group can hunt or fish anywhere inside Tsilhqot’in
territory. The right to harvest resides in the collective
Tsilhqot’in community. Individual community members
identify as Tsilhqot’in people first, rather than as band
members. 161
So although one Indian Act band, the Xeni Gwet’in, is currently the
caretaker or custodian of the Claim Area where Aboriginal rights and title
were declared, it is not the rights and title holder. Rights and title are vested
in the Tsilhqot’in Nation as a whole.162
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Although an Aboriginal rights rather than a title case (title was
claimed but not dealt with), it is worth comparing the decision of Justice
Garson in Ahousaht Indian Band with Tsilhqot’in Nation. In the former case,
Garson J. decided that the current holders of the Aboriginal right to fish
commercially are the five Indian Act bands that are the successor collectives
of the five Nuu-chah-nulth Nations whose practices, customs, and traditions
gave rise to the right.163 In reaching this conclusion, she accepted the
plaintiffs’ contention that, “[a]fter

British Columbia’s

entry into

Confederation in 1871, each of the Nuu-chah-nulth Nations was constituted
as a band under the predecessor of the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c.I-5, and,
today, each band is the legal representative of its predecessor Nation and the
lawful holder of the collective Aboriginal rights and title of that Nation.”164
Her decision that Indian Act bands are the current holders of the fishing right
was therefore based on the evidence, as was Justice Vickers’ decision in
Tsilhqot’in Nation that the Tsilhqot’in Nation as a whole is the holder of
Aboriginal rights and title.
Evidence of the identity of the appropriate current holders or
claimants of Aboriginal rights and title evidently must come from the
Indigenous people concerned. As Justice Groberman stated in his Court of
Appeal judgment in Tsilhqot’in Nation, expressing agreement with Justice
Vickers, “the definition of the proper rights holder is a matter to be
determined primarily from the viewpoint of the Aboriginal collective
itself.” 165 That viewpoint needs to be demonstrated by evidence. Given that
determination of the question of who has rights is at least partly a matter of
law, this suggests that Indigenous law is relevant to answer this question.
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But because Canadian judges are generally unfamiliar with Indigenous law
and cannot access it through conventional legal research, it has to be
presented to them mainly through testimony by Indigenous people who are
acknowledged in their communities as the authorities on that law.
Once the collective holder of Aboriginal rights or title has been
identified, one needs to consider who can exercise those rights or enjoy the
benefits of that title, and on what terms. 166 The kinds of rights involved,
whether rights to hunt, fish, occupy and use land, and so on, generally
cannot be enjoyed and exercised by a collective as such; instead, they are
enjoyed and exercised by individuals, families, and other smaller groups.
Given that the collective is necessarily made up of individual members, it is
essential to be able to determine who the members are. As Vickers J.
observed in Tsilhqot’in Nation, this is an internal matter to be decided by the
collective: “Membership is identified by the community. It should always be
the

particular

Aboriginal

community

that

determines

its

own

membership.”167
In my opinion, all this leads inevitably to the conclusion that the rights
or
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title

holding

collective

must

have

governmental

authority.168
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Governmental structures and powers are obviously necessary for a
community to make collective decisions about how its communal rights are
to be allocated and managed. 169 Determinations about membership in the
community also involve the exercise of governmental authority. This matter
of governance was put before the Supreme Court of Canada in Delgamuukw,
but the Court declined to consider it, sending the matter back to trial along
with the issue of the existence of Aboriginal title. 170 But now, with the
declaration of collective Aboriginal title in Tsilhqot’in Nation, the matter can
no longer be avoided. In the absence of guidance from Canadian courts,
Indigenous peoples can take the initiative in exercising their governance
authority. In the Tsilhqot’in Nation judgment, the Supreme Court expanded
the authority of the provinces over Aboriginal title lands by discarding the
application of the doctrine on interjurisdictional immunity in this context.171
One reason the Court gave for doing so was to avoid a legal vacuum. 172 But
given that Indigenous peoples have their own laws in relation to their title
lands and the exercise of other Aboriginal rights, there is no legal vacuum. 173
By exercising their governmental authority and ensuring that their laws are
respected, Indigenous peoples can “pro-actively use and manage” their title
lands, as the Supreme Court in Tsilhqot’in Nation said they have a right to
do.174
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